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STUDENT COMMENTS
MINE SAFETY LEGISLATION: A HISTORY OF NEGLECT
There has been much controversy in recent months over the neces-
sity for new federal coal mine health and safety legislation. The cat-
alyst for this interest was the explosion of Mountaineer No. 9 mine on
November 20, 1968, at Farmington, West Virginia, after which the
mine's 78 victims were sealed inside to prevent further ignitions.' It
was the type of incident which history shows has always been neces-
sary to elicit inquiry into the effectiveness of the nation's mining laws.
It is the purpose of this comment to investigate the adequacy of
present state and federal mining laws and to advance the basic proposi-
tion that strong federal legislation is required to establish and en-
force uniform, mandatory health and safety standards for coal mines.
This legislation must have both a remedial and a preventive effect. In
order to accomplish both of these purposes, four separate statutory
provisions will be necessary in new federal legislation: (1) a national
standard for respirable dust levels in all United States coal mines,
(2) federal compensation benefits for coal miner's pneumoconiosis or
"black lung," (3) mandatory civil penalties for the violation of stat-
utory safety provisions, and (4) the statutory creation of a cause of
action in tort in a federal court for injuries occasioned by willful vi-
olations of the federal code.
I. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
At present the primary responsibility for coal mine health and
safety resides with the individual states. A chief or director of mines,
usually appointed by the governor, directs a staff of inspectors whose
duty it is to implement the various state codes.' The power of a state
inspector usually includes the right to withdraw men from a mine
when in his opinion a dangerous condition exists.'
The federal government traditionally has not actively engaged in
the area of mine health and safety. A number of serious coal mine
disasters after the turn of the century resulted in the establishment in
1910 of the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Mines, designed
to promote health and safety in the mineral industry but not to estab-
lish and enforce standards. In 1941, Congress finally authorized federal
1
 See generally Hearings on S. 355, S. 467, S. 1094, S. 1178, S. 1300, S. 1907, S.
2118 and S. 2284 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 880-81 (1969) thereinafter cited as 1969
Senate Hearings].
2 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4151.04, 4151.06 (1968) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52
§§ 701-103(14), 701-104 (1961); Va. Code Ann. §§ 45.1-3, 45.1-4 (1966); W. Va. Code
§§ 22-1-3 to 22-1-4 (1958).
3 See, e.g., Ohio Rev, Code § 4151.34 (1968); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52 §§ 701-121
(1961); Va. Code Ann. § 45.1-5 (1966); W. Va. Code § 22-1-11 (1958).
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inspections of coal mines. The scope of these inspections was limited to
obtaining information and to making recommendations relative to
health and safety. Compliance with these recommendations, however,
was not mandatory. After a coal mine explosion killed 111 miners in
Illinois in March, 1947, Congress requested that mine operators and
state agencies report to the Department of the Interior the extent of
their compliance with the Bureau of Mines' recommendations, but con-
tinued to impose no penalties for failing to do so. 4
In 1952, Congress passed the present Federal Coal Mine Safety
Act.' For the first time the Department of the Interior was authorized
to enforce mandatory standards at underground coal mines, but the
Act is encumbered by a serious structural limitation; its standards and
prohibitions are designed to prevent only "major disasters," those
which result in the deaths of five or more men at one time.? Industry
statistics reveal that the vast majority of mine mishaps involve less
than five fatalities and are classified as "accidents" and not "di-
sasters."
The federal government has been deficient in promoting the cause
of industry-wide safety. The frequency of accidents has not been sig-
nificantly reduced over the past decade .° While the rate of major di-
sasters, which the Federal Act is aimed at preventing, has been
reduced," Mountaineer No. 9 is mute testimony that these disasters
have not been eliminated.
The Federal Coal Mine Safety Act assigns the Bureau of Mines
the function of determining the causes of accidents and occupational
disease with a view towards eliminating these causes." There is no en-
forcement power and the only penalty involved is a fine of up to $500
for not admitting a federal investigator to a mine.12
 Once he has been
admitted, the issues of accident and occupational disease prevention
are beyond federal enforcement power since his capacity is purely
advisory. Although under the section of the Act which is aimed at
preventing major disasters compliance with the federal inspector's
order is mandatory," the maximum penalty for non-compliance is only
$2,000 and has never been levied. 14
 While a federal inspector is em-
4 115 Cong. Rec. 2249-50 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1969) (introduction statement of
Russell E. Train, Under Secretary of the Interior, on S. 1300).
5 30 U.S.C. §§ 451 et seq. (1964).
0 30 U.S.C. §§ 471-83 (1964). From the creation of the Bureau of Mines in 1910,
until 1952 when the present act was passed, statistics show that 7,301 miners were
killed in 333 major disasters. 115 Cong. Rec. 2250 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1969).
7 See 1969 Senate Hearings at 450, 520.
8 For example, in 1968, 221 of the 309 fatalities were recorded as being caused by
accidents not covered by the provisions of existing law. Id. at 520.
9 From 1960 through 1968, the frequency of fatality accidents per million man hours
has actually increased from 1.15 to 1.28. Id. at 710.
10 Id. at 516, 613.
11
 30 U.S.C. § 451 (1964).
12 30 U.S.C. § 454 (1964).
19 30 U.S.C. §§ 473, 480 (1964).
14
 30 U.S.C. § 480 (1964). In a letter of March 23, 1968, to Stewart L. Udall,
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powered to require men to be withdrawn from an area in which he
finds that an imminent danger exists," only one annual federal inspec-
tion is required for each mine." One inspection per year will probably
not adequately disclose the existence of dangerous conditions which
are naturally continuous or recurring.
The present Federal Act also contains a system of arbitrary mine
classification based on a mine's potential for explosion." Under the
mining codes of virtually every coal producing state, a mine in which
the atmosphere at the working face is found by analysis to contain less
than 0.25 of 1 per cent of methane gas qualifies as a "non-gassy"
mine.' In practical effect, this classification allows the operator of such
a mine to use less expensive "non-permissible" equipment in that
mine." However, in the course of using this more dangerous machinery,
a pocket of methane gas may be released and a serious risk of explo-
sion created." Since 1952, 27 miners have been killed by 52 gas igni-
tions in "non-gassy" mines." The distinction between "gassy" and
"non-gassy" mines is an artificial one which has been inspired by eco-
nomic expediency,' but it is nonetheless still recognized in the present
Federal Act."
The most noteworthy deficiency in the Federal Coal Mine Safety
Act and in the various state mining statutes is the lack of a mandatory
maximum respirable dust level to be observed in coal mines. Such a
standard should be imposed nationally on all mines. Such uniformity
is only possible through the enactment of federal legislation.
IL A MANDATORY DUST STANDARD
Whereas coal mining creates many safety hazards,' it presents
but one dominant health hazard which arises from the inhalation of
coal dust. In many cases breathing this dust results in the pulmonary
Secretary of the Interior, Ralph Nader asserted that no penalty had ever been assessed
in the 15 year history of the Act. 1969 Senate Hearings at 1344.
15 30 U.S.C. § 473 (1964).
10 30 U.S.C. § 472 (1964).
17 30 U.S.C. § 479(b) (1964).
15 See, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52 §§ 701-103(7), (8) (1961); Va. Code Ann. §§ 45.1-
2(23), (24) (1966); W. Va. Code § 22-2-1(16) (Supp• 1969).
1D "Nonpermissible" equipment, basically, does not meet the U.S. Bureau of Mines'
standards for spark inhibition. For a discussion of the economics of this situation see
1969 Senate Hearings at pp. 884-912.
20 Id. at 1183.
21 Id. at 893.
22 Two facts highlight this artificiality: (1) since 1941 there has been a total of
1,126 mine fatalities due to fires and explosions. Of this number 23% have occurred in
"non-gassy" mines, and (2) under a "grandfather clause" in most statutes, non-permis-
sible equipment may be kept in use until inoperative, even when a mine is subsequently
classified as "gassy." Id. at 900
-01.
23
 See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 479(b) (1964).
24 The threats to safety fall into five general categories: roof falls, methane gas and
coal dust explosions, haulage accidents, electrical mishaps and machinery accidents.
Together, these causes accounted for 93% of all mining deaths in 1968. 1969 Senate
Hearings at 450.
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disease known as coal miner's pneumoconiosis, more commonly re-
ferred to as "black lung" disease. 25 It is progressive in nature and often
leads to total disability. According to an estimate by the United States
Surgeon General, it presently affects more than 100,000 bituminous
coal mine workers.'
Not all of the medical facts are as yet known about pneumoconi-
osis, but the essentials of cause and effect are understood. The dust
level in most United States mines is very high and the problem has
been compounded by the introduction of continuous mining machinery
into the industry in the 1950's. It has also been demonstrated that if
this dust level is controlled, so also is the incidence of the disease. The
cause of "black lung" is dust and the cure is dust control 27
The United States is the only major coal producing nation which
does not have an official government standard for coal mine dust. The
United States Public Health Service suspected adverse effects from
coal dust inhalation as early as 1952, but it was not until a study of
the prevalence of coal worker's pneumoconiosis in the miners of Ap-
palachia was completed in 1965, that substantive evidence of health
effects was made available." This study related the prevalence of the
disease to years of employment in the mine, but it could not be related
to coal dust concentration because data on contemporaneous dust
levels was not available. Thus, the level of coal dust exposure resulting
in the disease remains unknown. However, it is understood that expo-
sure over a number of years produces progressively adverse effects.'
The British experience in preventing "black lung" has been pro-
gressive. Isolated by the British in 1942, pneumoconiosis became a
compensable illness in the following year." In 15 years of mandatory
dust control in Great Britain, the incidence rate among bituminous coal
miners has been reduced from twelve to slightly over one new case per
thousand.' The British spend large sums of money on dust research,
ten million dollars in 1967 alone. By way of contrast, the United
States has spent only four and one-half million dollars in the last five
years.' For undetermined reasons there has been general reluctance
on the part of those associated with the American coal mining industry
to accept the validity of the British findings. This reluctance is re-
flected in the present condition of the mining laws, both state and
federal.
25 Coal miner's pneumoconiosis is a progressive pulmonary disease resulting from
the inhalation of coal dust particles. It often leads to progressive disability and death.
Id. at 720.
26 Id. at 729.
27 "There is no specific therapy for pneumoconiosis in either its simple or complicated
form. Adequate environmental dust controls . . . appear to be, under present technology,
the only helpful preventive procedures." See statement of Dr. William H. Stewart,
Surgeon General, Public Health Service, 1969 Senate Hearings at 720.
28 Id. at 574.
2° Id. at pp. 574, 575.
36 Id. at 671.
31 Id. at 663.
32 Id. at 668.
34
MINE SAFETY LEGISLATION
In December, 1968, the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare recommended to the Department of the Interior a federal
permissible respirable dust level for United States coal mines." This
standard called for a level not to exceed 3.0 milligrams per cubic
meter.' It is an interim standard but, based on the present state of
knowledge, this standard would significantly reduce the rate at which
new cases of pneumoconiosis would develop in the future and old
cases would progress." The imposition of such a standard must be
considered an essential feature of any new federal legislation. Legisla-
tion not containing such a standard would be totally unresponsive to
the greatest health hazard in coal mining.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this suggested dust standard is
somewhat unclear due to the difficulty of converting the British dust
research data into quantities measureable by the standard instruments
used in United States mines." This fact raises an interesting and rel-
evant policy question. Since standards will in all probability require
revision from time to time, given the changing nature of production
technology, should the Secretary of the Interior be authorized to effect
such revision by simply promulgating new regulations, or, as in the
case of the present Federal Act should such changes require separate
statutory enactment?
The requirement for separate statutory enactment of revised
standards is in large measure responsible for the present ineffectiveness
of federal legislation. Because of the necessary expenditure of time
and money, needed revisions in the form of new legislation have
generally not been made. Thus, the Department of the Interior has
been prevented from developing new responses to minimize the risks
inherent in changing mining methods. The present Federal Act was
passed in 1952, a year when new, highly mechanized forms of mining
apparatus, such as the continuous mining machine," were just coming
into use. The introduction of this machinery greatly increased the
hazards of roof falls and methane gas explosions. It also increased the
33 Id. at 722.
34 There is no statistical indicator of present dust levels in United States coal mines.
But, in the opinion of Dr. I. E. Buff, Chairman, Committee of Physicians for Miners'
Health and Safety, Charleston, W. Va., it is quite high: "You talk about dust standards.
You know it makes me smile sometimes the way you talk about 3 milligrams and about
4 and one-half milligrams. My lord, in some of those mines it is 300 milligrams. You
can't see a foot ahead of you." 1969 Senate Hearings at 642.
The testimony of Dr. Donald Rasmussen, Appalachian Regional Hospital, Beckley,
W. Va., is similar: "In the vast majority the dust in the mines, particularly at the work-
ing face, is so dense, as Dr. Buff said, that one may not see his hand extended in front
of him two or three feet away. ... I do not believe the Bureau of Mines has dust
measurements under these conditions nor do I believe industry has any that would be
published." Id. at 660.
35 Id. at 724.
30
 For a complete discussion of the conversion problem, see 1969 Senate Hearings at
733-50.
37 The continuous miner is about 25 feet long and 7 feet wide. In one basic operation
it can perform the tasks of cutting, drilling, blasting and loading. It is capable of digging
and loading up to four tons of coal a minute.
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health hazard caused by the excessive liberation of dust particles. But
from that year, in which new risks were accumulating so rapidly, until
the present time, there has been no significant change in the federal
statute."
Flexibility of response is essential to the effectiveness of any new
legislation," particularly in the area of dust control where so much
research is needed. The industry's criticism that such flexibility invests
the Secretary of the Interior with the power to impose arbitrary stan-
dards which the industry would have to meet on short notice is without
merit." It would be an easy matter to provide legislatively for some
form of administrative review or advisory board, representative of all
interests, before which orders of the Secretary could be challenged.
Also, there should be a provision in a new federal act for ultimate
judicial review of agency actions.
Mine health and safety technology lags far behind the state of
concurrent production technology. 41 This creates an inherently danger-
ous situation which is aggravated by freezing existing safety standards
into statutory law. An effective federal code should allow the utilization
of new technology to serve the cause of health and safety, particularly
in the area of dust control, by requiring the implementation of stan-
dards which have been formulated to solve contemporary problems, not
problems as they existed twenty years earlier. Legislation allowing
flexibility in standards will have the ultimate effect of promoting the
development of new technology to eliminate existing dangers such as
dust inhalation.
III. COMPENSATION FOR PNEUMOCONIOSIS
Federal legislation concerning coal mine health and safety must
have a remedial as well as a preventive effect. The present Federal
Coal Mine Safety Act provides no legal remedy for pneumoconiosis. A
new federal act must provide such a remedy to be effective. Legislation
relating to compensation for claims growing out of the occupation is
generally a matter of state concern, but at the present time only four
of twenty-seven coal producing states compensate the victims of coal
miner's pneumoconiosis." Of these four, West Virginia only began
compensation coverage as recently as July 1, 1969.
38 On March 26, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-376, 80 Stat. 84 was enacted. Its only effect
was to remove the existing exemptions from regulation of coal mines which employed
no more than 14 individuals underground. It amended §§ 471-73, 475-77, 480 and 482 of
30 U.S.C. (1964).
38
 Flexibility of response has ample statutory precedent. Among other federal acts
which vest regulatory power in the agency itself are: the National Traffic & Motor
Vehicle Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969); the Federal Food, //rug
and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1964) ; the Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1964) and; the Natural Gas Pipeline Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1671 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969).
40
 For general discussion of this Issue, see 1969 Senate Hearings at 541-71.
41 Id. at 538.
42
 See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 26 § 313(1) (1958); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77 § 1401 (1965);
Va. Code Ann. § 65.1-47 (1968); W. Va. Code § 23-4-1 (Supp. 1969).
43 W. Va. Code § 23-4-1 (Supp. 1969).
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"Black lung" is not compensable in 23 mining states because of
a Iong-standing reluctance on the part of the mining industry, its physi-
cians, the Bureau of Mines and state legislators to accept the validity
of the British findings. 44 In the early 20th century silica dust was
considered the only important pulmonary threat in mining and sili-
cosis the primary occupational disease." But British investigators
continued their studies of pulmonary aberrations thought to be asso-
ciated with coal dust, and in 1927 were reporting X-ray differences
between silica and coal dust exposure. In 1934 limited workmen's com-
pensation awards were available to British coal miners disabled by
silicosis." But the number of men receiving these awards was but a
small percentage of all the miners with pulmonary disability because
this disability, although acknowledged, was not traceable to silicosis.'
Concern with the inequity of this situation prompted the British Medi-
cal Council, in 1937, to initiate intensive research which ultimately led
to the isolation of coal worker's pneumoconiosis as a separate disease.
In 1943 it was made compensable along with silicosis."
The compensation laws in 23 of our coal mining states are at the
same stage as the British compensation laws were in 1934. Conse-
quently, in these states a miner who is suffering from "black lung" and
seeks compensation for it must display medical evidence of silicosis,
from which he is in fact not suffering. Thus, there is no remedy for
pneumoconiosis, per se.
Coal worker's pneumoconiosis is recognized as a compensable
disease in Pennsylvania, Virginia, Alabama and West Virginia. Un-
fortunately, many inequities still exist in the formulation and adminis-
tration of these compensation statutes. For example, the West Virginia
statute does not provide benefits for victims of "black lung" who were
forced to cease work before the effective date of the Act, July 1, 1969. 49
This is because workmen's compensation is judicially held to be a
contractual relationship between employer and employee," and a
retroactive application of a new statute would unconstitutionally im-
pair the obligation of the contract" formed between the miner and
the employer under the old act which did not cover pneumoconiosis."
The basis for objection is that the retroactive claim would be payed
from a fund to which the employer had contributed under the old act.
Of course, if the claim were paid out of state general revenues, that
basis for objection would no longer exist. If these retroactive claims
44 For the history of providing compensation for this disease, see 1969 Senate
Hearings at 669-94.
:os rd.. at 671.
:;
49 W. Va. Code §§ 23-4-1 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
so See Gooding v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S.E. 862 (1916).
51 See Maxwell v. State Compensation Director, 150 W. Va. 123, 144 S.E.2d 493
(1965).
52
 See State v. Pennybacker, 131 W. Va. 442, 48 S.E.2d 9 (1948).
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are not paid in West Virginia, the inequity will remain for as long as
the last miner, disabled by "black lung" and unable to collect some
form of compensation, survives.
Inequities also arise through the operation of statutes of limita-
tions barring recovery by "black lung" victims. As previously de-
scribed, the disease is progressive." For example, simple pneumoconi-
osis, which often causes no disability, always precedes progressive
massive fibrosis which is the terminal form of the affliction. But once
the simple form of the disease has been contracted, with or without
ensuing disability, disabling fibrosis may yet appear long after the
miner has left the mining industry. The development of this fibrosis
seems to be independent of additional dust exposure once a certain
degree of simple pneumoconiosis has been reached." Thus, the statute
of limitations should only begin to run from the time that a disabling
form of the disease manifests itself and is diagnosed as such. This,
however, is not the case in any of the four states which recognize the
existence of "black lung."
Under the Pennsylvania occupational disease statute, prior to its
amendment in 1965, compensation for this disease was payable for
death or total disability, defined as the inability to do light work, and
such total disability must have occurred, "within four years after the
date of his last employment in such occupation or industry." 55 Such
a provision was unduly restrictive in view of the facts that total dis-
ability from progressive massive fibrosis may occur at any time after
acquiring simple pneumoconiosis, and that this simple form of the dis-
ease is rarely disabling to the point of preventing one from doing light
work."
53
 Physicians classify coal miner's pneumoconiosis as simple or complicated, de-
pending upon the degree of evidence in the X-Ray picture. in the simple form
pinpoint, micro-nodular or nodular lesions distributed throughout the lungs show
up in the X-Ray picture. The physician decides the so-called radiological cate-
gory of simple pneumoconiosis on the basis of the extent of the opacities.
There are no specific symptoms and pulmonary function tests seldom enable
the physician to say whether or not the patient has the disease. It is generally
accepted by physicians that simple pneumoconiosis seldom produces significant
ventilatory impairment, but, the pinpoint type may reduce the diffusing capacity,
the ability to transfer oxygen from the lungs into the blood.
Complicated pneumoconiosis is a more serious disease. The patient incurs
progressive massive fibrosis as a complex reaction to dust and other factors,
which may include tuberculosis and other infections. The disease in this form
usually produces marked pulmonary impairment and considerable respiratory
disability. Such respiratory disability severely limits the physical capabilities of
the individual, can induce death by cardiac failure, and may contribute to other
causes of death.
Statement of Surgeon Genera!, 1969 Senate Hearings at 720.
54 "Once it gets into the lungs it is progressive .. . . If a man leaves a mine 10 years
later it affects him. He gets short of breath, he develops the emphysema, he develops the
right heart failure and out he goes." Statement of Dr. I. E. Buff, 1969 Senate Hearings
at 641.
55 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77 § 1401 (1965).
56 See supra notes 9 and 10.
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The Pennsylvania legislature amended the statute in 1965, in an
attempt to eliminate these obvious inequities. Individuals who could
not qualify under the "basic act," i.e., that subject to the statute of
limitations and its total disability provisions," can now receive $75
per month for life if they are presently totally disabled and can trace
their disability to the disease.' However, requiring total disability,
thus defined, remains a harsh provision under any circumstances.
Being relatively limited by education and experience in his alternatives
for employment, a miner in Pennsylvania becoming only partially dis-
abled from "black lung" nevertheless cannot establish a claim under
any circumstances even though such partial disability might prevent
him from continued employment as a miner.
Virginia, Alabama and West Virginia, while not imposing the re-
quirement of total disability, do impose definite statutory periods within
which claims must be brought." These statutes are also inconsistent
with the present state of medical knowledge concerning the nature of
the disease.
Virginia now requires death or disability to occur within one year
after a diagnosis is communicated to the employee or within five years
after the date of the last injurious exposure to the disease in employ-
ment, whichever occurs first." Thus. this statute imposes an effective
five year limitation upon claims. After this period has run, no com-
pensation. even for subsequent total disability, is available. The stat-
utes of limitations of the West Virginia and Alabama occupational
disease acts are three years"- and one vear," respectively.
Present state statutes dealing with "black lung" disease are inad-
equate for two reasons. The primary deficiency is the unavailability of
compensation for pneumoconiosis in the majority of mining states. The
secondary problem is that even in the states that do provide coverage,
the applicable statute of limitations may effectively bar recovery.
It is submitted that any federal health and safety legislation must
serve a remedial as well as a preventive function. It must therefore in-
clude compensation provisions subject to a statute of limitations which
begins to run only when a competent medical diagnosis of any disabling
form of the disease has been communicated to the disabled miner. In
addition to federal payments, Congress should authorize grants through
the Secretary of the Interior to provide incentives to states for devel-
oping their own workmen's compensation programs. The present fed-
57 See, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77 § 1401(c) (1965).
58
 See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77 § 1401(i) (1965). The present Pennsylvania basic act
requires that a claimant, in order to avail himself of the basic claim of $12,750 paid at
the rate of $60 per week, must become totally disabled within four years of his last
exposure. However, if he exceeds the statute of limitations, this section allows him to
receive $75 per month for life from whatever time he does become totally disabled.
59
 See, e.g., Ala. Code tit, 26 § 313(10) (1958); Va. Code Ann. § 65.1-52 (1968);
W. Va. Code § 23-4-15 (Supp. 1969).
60
 Va. Code Ann. § 65.1-52 (1968).
61 W. Va. Code § 23-4-15 (Supp. 1969).
82
 Ala. Code tit. 26 § 313(10) (1958).
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eral law contains neither subsidy payments to states nor compensation
to miners. Although the initial cost of such a federal program would be
undoubtedly substantial, the financial burden would be of limited
duration because the implementation of a mandatory dust standard
could eliminate the high incidence of "black lung" in little over a dec-
ade."
IV. THE IMPOSITION OF MANDATORY PENALTIES
No health and safety legislation can effectively serve a preventive
function unless it imposes mandatory civil penalties for its violation.
The present Federal Coal Mine Safety Act authorizes no mandatory
penalties. Under most state statutes the violation of a statutory pro-
vision is a misdemeanor and is punishable by fines ranging from $10
to $500, jail sentences of up to one year, or both." Any fines author-
ized under the present Federal Act and the state codes are left to the
discretion of the inspector or the state mining authority.
Some satutory violations by mine operators create hazards so
severe that the mere fact of the violation should demand the assessment
of a penalty. An operator who allows unsafe equipment to be used in
his mine should not merely be permitted to remove this equipment
persuant to a mine inspector's order; he should be fined for allowing
the condition to exist, and the fine should not be at the discretion of
the inspector. Any discretion should be vested in the Secretary of In-
terior and should not be exercized until after the penalty has been
assessed. He could be given the power to compromise the penalty
after considering the amount of the penalty, the appropriateness of
the penalty to the size of the business of the operator charged, the
effect on the operator's ability to continue in business, the gravity
of the violation, and the demonstrated good faith of the operator
charged in attempting to achieve rapid compliance. Bills have been
submitted to Congress requiring heavy, mandatory civil penalties, some
as high as $20,000," for health and safety violations by a mine
operator.
The effectiveness of these provisions will be limited, however,
since enforcement requires the presence of a federal inspector in the
mine when a violation exists. Considering that present federal law
requires that a mine be inspected only once a year" and that the most
demanding of the proposals submitted to Congress sets a minimum of
only three inspections per year," the limited prevention possibilities
which even severe penalties afford is clear.
An effective federal inspection would necessitate policing about
63
 See 1969 Senate Hearings at 1025-26, and Hearings on H.R. 4047, H.R. 4295
and H.R. 7976 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 315 (1969).
64
 See, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52 §§ 701-03 (1966); Va. Code Ann. § 45.1-33
(1967); W. Va. Code § 22-2-78 (1966).
65 See S. 1094, 1969 Senate Hearings at 84.
68
 30 U.S.C. § 472(a) (1964).
87
 See S. 1300, 1969 Senate Hearings at 198.
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6,000 coal mines presently active in the United States.° 8
 While the most
effective inspection system would require a permanent inspector in
every mine, the cost would be prohibitive. Even adequate inspections
on a periodic basis would be extremely costly. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that these funds might be put to better use by the Bureau of
Mines in advancing the state of research with regard to dust control,
roof support and gas detection. Thus, federal enforcement through
inspection would seem to be of limited effectiveness and other enforce-
ment methods must also be utilized.
V. A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION IN TORT
Since most of the money spent in coal mining research has been
used to develop new production techniques," and since proportionately
less money has been spent on the lower priority of health and safety,
the present laws are based on an outmoded technology. Nevertheless,
there is widespread belief throughout the mining industry that, if the
present state and federal mine safety statutes were strictly enforced,
death and accident rates in coal mines would be significantly reduced."
The most effective approach to the enforcement of health and
safety legislation is to make the wrongdoer, in this case the mine oper-
ator, pay his victim for the injuries inflicted. But under the provisions
of all state workmen's compensation statutes as judicially construed,
the employer cannot be held liable in a tort action instituted by his
victim." Removing this disability would greatly aid the enforceability
of coal mine health and safety legislation.
The purpose of workmen's compensation statutes is to effect a
compromise between employer and employee in apportioning damages
for personal injuries suffered by the employee. The employee sur-
renders his right to bring an action at law against his employer and
agrees to accept as compensation for his injuries a sum limited by
statute. The employer surrenders any right to a defense based on con-
tributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule,
but he is relieved of liability to the employee for damages which in
an ordinary negligence case he might otherwise be liable for to a greater
extent. The only issue to be determined in a compensation proceeding
is whether or not the claimant suffered the injury by accident in the
course of his employment. Thus, the purpose of compensation laws is
to provide payment for accidental injuries incurred in the course of
employment without regard to the negligence of the parties.
68 See 1969 Senate Hearings at 489.
89 See 1969 Senate Hearings at 640. Dr. I. E. Buff maintains that the federal gov-
ernment expended $63,000,000 in coal research for new markets in 1969 and less than
$1,000,000 for coal dust control.
70
 For instance, in 1965, 88% of the fatalities that occurred in Virginia mines resulted
from noncompliance; in 1966, 80%; in 1967, 87%%, and in 1968, 91.7%. See 1969 Senate
Hearings at 1191.
71
 See, e.g., W. Va. Code § 23-2-6 (1966); Ala. Code tit. 26 § 272 (1958); Va. Code
Ann. § 65.1-40 (1968); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.015 (1956).
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Workmen's compensation statutes may reduce an employer's
observance of health and safety statutes because they have the effect
of giving the employer immunity from actions in tort even if his ac-
tions seem more intentional than negligent. One expert observed:
My experience in the West Virginia and Pennsylvania coal-
fields leads me to the inescapable conclusion that the main
factor which has led to the deplorable conditions in and
around the mines is the fact that employers are effectively
immune from suit under most State compensation acts and
they are not liable for even the most callous disregard for the
health and safety practices." (Emphasis added.)
The employer receives this blanket immunity for a relatively small
investment." Awards are paid from a fund, invested and administered
by the state, into which each employer simply pays premiums depend-
ing upon the size of his work force and his accident experience." While
it might be argued that preservation of a low accident record might be
sufficient reason for an employer to run a safe mine, the argument
fails for two reasons: first, the amount assessed on the basis of a poor
record will not approach what might be demanded as tort damages,
and, secondly, even with a careless and unsafe operation a mine owner
might continue to operate for many years without an unusually high
incidence of accidents while the fact would remain that he was court-
ing a major disaster because it was more economical to do so. More-
over, merely by contributing his premium the employer enjoys absolute
immunity from a direct civil action at law by his employee, even for
the most extreme negligence."
Providing such immunity from liability for injuries occasioned by
conscious disregard of safety rules or gross negligence with regard to
known and published safety standards encourages the continuation of
unsafe practices and conditions. It has been maintained that the con-
scious violation of a safety standard which is the proximate cause of
sickness or injury is not an "accident" within the meaning of a work-
men's compensation statute. Justice Musmanno of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, dissenting in Hyzy v. Pittsburg Coal Co.," stated:
It is not likely that the Legislature, in passing the Workmen's
Compensation Act, intended to bar from compensation em-
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 1969 Senate Hearings at 661-62.
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 See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 26 § 272 (1958); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.015 (1956); Va.
Coda Ann. § 65.1-40 (1968); W. Va. Code § 23-2-6 (1966).
74 Procedures vary between states. Some provide for a state administered fund only;
some provide for a choice between a private insurer and a state plan, and some permit
the employer to be a self-insurer. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 65.1-104 (1968). (Under
this section all three options are allowed.) In West Virginia, all premiums are paid into
a State compensation fund. W. Va. Code §§ 23-2-1-5 (1966).
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 See King v. Empire Colliers Co., 148 Va. 585, 139 S.E. 478 (1927); Brewer v.
Appalachian Constructors, 135 W. Va. 739, 65 S.E.2d 87 (1951); Maynard v. Island
Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 175 S.E. 70 (1934).
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 384 Pa. 316, 121 A.2d 85 (1956).
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ployees who violate safety laws and yet immunize employers
from liability in trespass actions when they ignore the same
safety laws. If violation of a safety law takes the claimant
out of the course of employment, a disregarding of statutory
requirements by the employer must remove him from the pro-
tection of the Workmen's Compensation law. 77
Many state mining codes establish a cause of action in tort for
death or injury occasioned by an operator's willful violation of, or
failure to comply with, a statutory provision. 78 Even the workmen's
compensation laws in several states provide that if death or injury is
occasioned by a willful or deliberate intent on the part of the employer
to injure the employee, such an injury is outside the scope of the work-
men's compensation law and gives rise to an action in tort on an elec-
tive basis. 7° However, courts have consistently construed "deliberate
intent" and "willfulness" as meaning more than negligence, however
gross or wanton.8°
Such judicial construction is capable of producing undesirable
results in the area of enforcement and should be remedied legislatively.
The impediment to effective enforcement created by this judicial con-
struction would be removed by the legislative enactment of a uniform
jury instruction defining "willfulness" in health or safety violation
cases as follows:
a conscious indifference to a known and correctable inher-
ently dangerous health or safety hazard ignored and not rem-
edied by an employer, i.e. where such injury, disease or death
is due to the deliberate intent of the employer . . . 81
77 Id. at 320, 121 A.2d at 89.
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 See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 52.618 (1947) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 93 § 28(c) (1947);
Ohio Rev. Code § 4155.13 (1968); Wyo. Stat. § 30-141 (1945).
7° See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 51.24-020 (1962) (provides for an action against
the employer for any excess of damages over the provisions of the workmen's compensa-
tion act); Md. Ann. Code art. 101 § 44 (1957); N. Mex. Stat. § 59-10-7 (failure of an
employer to comply with a safety statute which causes an injury—benefits increased by
10%) ; Mo. Stat. Ann. § 287.120(4) (Supp. 1968) (benefits increased by I5%); Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 342.015(a) (1963); W. Va. Code § 23-4-2 (Supp. 1969).
8° See Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, 135 W. Va. 739, 65 S.E.2d 87 (1951) ;
Fryman v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 277 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1955), where it was said
that "deliberate intention" implies that the employer must have determined to injure the
employee and that where the allegation is that the dangerous condition under which the
employees worked was known to the employer, such an allegation is not sufficient to
support an action at common law.
See also Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946), where the
court indicated that the workmen's compensation act includes a wanton injury inflicted
on the employee by the employer if it arises out of and in the course of the employment.
81
 See 1969 Senate Hearings at A4. (Sample jury instruction is reprinted below.)
(b) This section shall supercede any state legislation granting immunity
from common law damages in instances in which injury, disease, or death is
due to conscious indifference to a known and correctable inherently dangerous
health or safety hazard ignored and not remedied by an employer, i.e. where
such injury, disease or death is due to the deliberate intent of the employer.
The issue of whether the employer was guilty of deliberate intention shall be
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Such an instruction respects the basic objectives of the workmen's
compensation system and preserves employer incentive to observe
safety standards since the best precaution against suits for large dam-
ages is to run a safe mine.
A federal cause of action in tort, although previously unused
in the area of coal mine safety, might prove to be an effective aid
in enforcing a new federal health and safety code. Its effectiveness
would depend in large measure upon the availability to miners of in-
formation concerning their rights under such a statute, and upon the
availability of competent legal counsel. Its effectiveness would also
depend upon the extent to which an employer is permitted his common
law defenses under such a statute. If the injured employee possesses
the right to elect between recovery in either tort or workmen's com-
pensation, it would seem reasonable to allow the employer his common
law defenses, particularly since the defense of assumption of risk has
been losing vitality in the area of employer-employee relations." How-
ever, it may be equally reasonable to place an affirmative duty on the
employer to provide his employees a safe place to work, in which case
the only issue to be determined would be whether the employee's con-
tinuing to work, with or without protest, and with knowledge of his
employer's failure to correct an unsafe condition, constituted con-
tributory negligence.
A viable common law right of recovery requires the elimination of
the fellow servant rule which bars recovery from the employer if the
injury was caused, even partially, by the negligence of a fellow
determined by a jury, in the following manner. The following questions shall be
submitted to the jury by the trial judge:
1. Whether the employer permitted to exist a condition which was inher-
ently dangerous to his employees, that is, a condition which an ordinary prudent
employer, acting under the same or similar circumstances should know would
ultimately result in the death, serious injury, or disease, including respiratory
ailments, of one or more of his employees.
2. Whether such inherently dangerous condition existed for a sufficient
length of time so that an ordinary prudent employer acting under the same or
similar circumstances would have or should have known of its existence, and
had time and opportunity to correct such condition, and the condition could have
been corrected.
If the jury should answer the above two questions in the affirmative, then
the jury may conclude that the employer chose to run the risk of death, serious
injury, or disease, including respiratory ailments, to his employees rather than
to expend the money or take other appropriate measures to correct the inher-
ently dangerous condition and the jury may accordingly find that the employer
was guilty of deliberate intention and award such damages as they deem just
for any injury, death, or disease, including respiratory ailments, proximately
caused by such deliberate intention.
The willful or continued violation of any safety rule or regulation of any
federal, state, or other governmental regulatory authority, or any contractual
agreement between employer and employee, or their representative, which shall
be found by the jury to have proximately caused injury, disease, including respira-
tory ailments, or death to an employee shall constitute a rebuttable prima facie
case of deliberate intention against the employer.
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 See Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
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worker. This is essential because many industrial accidents are related
to minor statutory infractions on the part of fellow miners. Moreover,
the elimination of this defense would not be unduly harsh on the em-
ployer since a claimant would have the burden of establishing that,
standing alone, the negligence of his fellow worker could not have
caused the accident without the employer's conscious disregard for
safety in allowing a dangerous condition to exist.
CONCLUSION
The history of coal mine health and safety legislation in the United
States has been marked by unresponsiveness, apathy and neglect.
Despite strong evidence of the deadly effects of coal worker's pneu-
moconiosis, the disease is compensable by legislation in only a few
states. Moreover, far too few resources have been devoted to the de-
velopment of new safety technology, more healthy working conditions,
and better enforcement of existing laws.
The 1969 hearings on new health and safety legislation before
the Senate and House of Representatives subcommittees produced
evidence indicating that the present deficiency in health and safety
legislation is due to a lack of technological development in the area
of accident and disease prevention; that the imposition of national
health and safety standards would prompt the development of the
technology necessary to implement the standards; and that the dif-
ficulty of enforcing present state and federal legislation has contrib-
uted to the generally poor safety record in the coal mining industry.
There is an urgent need for a strong, federal law which imposes
uniform health and safety standards. A mandatory dust standard
will prevent new cases of "black lung" from developing. Compen-
sation payments for victims of the disease are necessary to remove
the social burden of disabled miners and to provide them with a mea-
sure of security and self respect. Mandatory penalties and a right to
sue in tort will prompt mine owners to more closely observe health and
safety standards. Also, the Secretary of the Interior should be autho-
rized to promulgate binding regulations which would be from time to
time updated to keep pace with technological developments in the area
of coal mine safety. These measures should be the minimum accept-
able to Congress in any new mine health and safety legislation. 83
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83 Following the completion of this Comment, mine safety legislation was passed
by both houses of Congress. On October 2, 1969, the Senate passed S. 2917, Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. In relevant part, this bill authorizes: (1) the
establishment of an interim dust standard for all United States mines, (2) the Surgeon
General and the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate health and safety standards,
(3) civil penalties up to a maximum of $25,000 per violation, (4) limited, short term
compensation benefits for totally disabled miners, and (5) the appropriation of funds
for health and safety research in the amounts of $20,000,000 in fiscal 1970, $25,000,000
in fiscal 1971 and $30,000,000 in fiscal 1972. See 115 Cong. Rec. 11772-88 (daily ed.
Oct. 2, 1969).
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